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Introduction 	
Mali, a country once referred to as a 'poster child' for democracy and good governance 
(Lebovich, USAID 4), proved to be a hollow showcase instead. In 2012, Mali faced shock after 
shock eventually turning into a complete collapse of the country. For many international 
observers who had applauded Mali's decentralized governance, free press and economic 
development, the series of events came as a surprise (Harmon 71, 76). On the 22nd of March 
came the breaking news that Mali´s ruling party was overthrown by a group of junior army 
officers. This was followed by the information that this state coup was a result of a rebellion that 
had occupied most of Northern Mali and had been ongoing since January of the same year. 
Angry about their uncareful deployment in the Northern region of Mali, the officers justified the 
coup by the consideration of "the notorious incapacity of the regime to manage the crisis in the 
North" (ORTM). Slightly two weeks after, on the 6th of April, the movement behind the 
rebellion declared a large part of Northern Mali independent. However, its victory did not last 
long. The nationalist fighters were ousted from the main cities of the North by Al-Qaida 
affiliated movements. The nationalist rebel group which had called for independence, known as 
the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) is a secular Tuareg dominated 
group. Its members wanted the region they call Azawad, which covers most of Northern Mali, to 
be independent. Many other parties were involved in what became a still ongoing crisis. Yet, 
what is important for this thesis is how the ethnic group the Tuareg has been portrayed as a result 
of the rebellion. Critics realized that the collapse of Mali was not as unforeseen as first thought. 
Indeed, it had already been the fourth time since independence a Tuareg-led rebellion broke out 
in Mali. Consequently the 2012 crisis has been explained as the latest uprising of the Tuareg 
against the government. 
Although the 2012 revolt is indeed the fourth major uprising of the Tuareg against the 
state, the risk and consequence of interpreting it as such has been to ignore the heterogeneous 
character of the nation as well as its history. The current tendency is to portray the Tuareg as a 
people having continuously and unanimously expressed nationalism, as if the Tuareg nation is a 
fixed community and a self-evident group of people. Special Forces Officer Douglas Livermore, 
who has done special operations assignments in northern Mali, wrote: "For well over a century, 
the Tuareg people of Northern Mali have struggled to form an independent nation which they 
call ‘Azawad’" (283). Similarly, independent researcher and writer for the Hampton Institute, 
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Devon Douglas-Bowers has stated that "The Tuareg people have consistently wanted self-
independence and in pursuit of such goals have engaged in a number of rebellions". Also 
Clingendael researchers Chauzal and Van Damme wrote about the "constant rebellion" as a 
result of a "historical continuity of Tuareg anger" (30) and so did many more. Although none 
would deny these are simplified representations, they do show a lack of understanding of what is 
at stake. In reality the evolution of the nation has been a process that has known discontinuity 
and disruption. Discontinuity because the nation has had no rigid, but changing boundaries. 
Disruption because the nation has had its ups and downs: the rebellions and those periods in 
between. Although the evolution of Tuareg nationalism has been an historical process, it has in 
no way been a linear one.   
To misinterpret the evolution of the Tuareg nation problematic as it might lead to a non-
context sensitive response of both Mali and the international community. Although the 
international community has now turned its attention to other armed groups in the context of the 
'War on Terror', no one wants a fifth rebellion to occur in the future. Therefore, a thorough 
understanding is needed of what constructs and deconstructs national identity, ones wish for self-
determination of the nation. In the existing literature on nationalism, little research has been done 
that offers insight in the formation and deformation of national identities. This thesis will aim to 
do just that. It will do so by building upon a political theory called 'Politics of Partaking', 
developed by Patrick Chabal, one of the leading scholars in African History and Politics. To 
answer and illustrate how Chabal’s Politics of Partaking help understand national identity 
construction among the Tuareg, it will take the four rebellions as separate case studies. These 
moments best show the inconsistencies of national identities and therefore of the nation. Before 
going into these four case studies this thesis will first elaborate on theories of the nation and 
national identity and explain why these are limited. It will also introduce the reader to 
nationalism in post-colonial Africa in order to illustrate why political theorization and in 
particular Politics of Partaking can offer a more realistic insight of national identity construction. 
This will  bring the thesis to three explanatory chapters: one on the Politics of Partaking, one on 
the Tuareg as a people and one on the historical context of the Tuareg under colonialism. The 
last chapter before the conclusion will then be the actual case study in which the added value of 
the ´Politics of Partaking´ will be assessed by analyzing the four rebellions. The four chapters all 
consist of an informative part and an analytical part. The findings will suggest that Chabal´s 
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Politics of partaking can help understand how national identities are constructed by analyzing the 
relation between the Tuareg and the state. 		
The Nation, National Identity and Post-Colonial Politics in Africa 
A nation is a group of people who either live in or seek to possess a common homeland 
(Ashmore et al. 74). A nation can overlap with a state, like nation-states do, but can also come 
into existence without the blessings of a state. Nationalism is the respective ideological doctrine 
of the nation, asserting that the nation should be politically autonomous. It stresses shared 
characteristics of the nation that differentiate it from others (Ashmore et al. 74). Examples of 
these characteristics are language, ethnicity, culture, and opinion. The homogeneity between 
nations consists of the wish for the congruence of the nation and the state (Weber 21-25). In this 
light, national identity can be seen as sharing the nation's wish of establishing a common 
homeland. Although not all scholars would agree with this interpretation of the meaning of 
national identity, it will be understood as such within this thesis. This is because the people, who 
share the nation's wish for self-determination, naturally define the boundaries of the community 
expressing nationalism, which is at the core of this research.  
Although it is increasingly accepted that the nation is a social construct, which implies 
that the nation has been shaped as a product of time, little research has been done on the dynamic 
character of nations. This is because theories of nationalism analyze the nation as a collective 
subject. The nation is, as Benedict Anderson wrote, an 'imagined community', a product of what 
members believe is a cohesive whole. Nationalist discourses present the nation as a 
homogeneous community, dividing the world, into "us and them, friends and foes", according to 
Umut Özkirimli (208). The fixed and homogeneous identity of the nation differentiates, from the 
viewpoint of nationalists, those within the nation from those outside of it. Research on national 
identity construction has therefore focused on how discourses of sameness and difference 
generated and reproduced the idea of the nation (Wodak 186). The subjective antiquity of the 
nation in the eyes of nationalists is, however, paradoxical to the reality that is relevant to political 
and historical science and, therefore, this thesis. It does not help comprehend why the nation 
suffers disruptions and is subject to change.  
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To understand why people start expressing nationalism, we should go back to the realities 
of nationalism as a political ideology in Africa. In Africa, colonizers marked the confines of their 
imperium with boundaries ignoring the territorial habitats the Africans called their homeland. At 
the time of independence, the formerly drawn boundaries were often taken over by the new post-
colonial states. For the new African leaders, the relation between the state and the nation, in 
Benjamin Neuberger's words, became “a self-evident truism” (232). They shared a common 
interest in uniting these states with unified national identities (Forrest 33). The nation-state, here, 
was not so much the result of the shared characteristics of its citizens, but instead constituted by 
the differences it wanted to overcome (Joseph 57). It was an attempt to control an ethnically 
heterogeneous group of people. Yet, these national identities were often grounded in what 
unified smaller groups within states, failing to include all of the population. The most obvious 
example is the decision of what was to become the official language of a country. Mali’s official 
language, for instance, Bambara was spoken by the largest ethnic group but not by many other 
ethnicities. National identity has consequently been difficult to sustain and has created artificial 
states, those with boundaries that are not congruent with the division of nationalities the people 
long for (Alesina, Easterly and Matuszeski 146). The post-colonial years have consequently 
experienced a rise in ethnically framed internal nationalisms calling, according to Joseph Forrest, 
for "special rights" or "secessionism" (33). The point is that nationalism in Africa is very much a 
phenomenon that resulted from post-colonial politics. The rise of internal nationalisms, in 
particular, is dependent on whether or not the national identity of the newly independent states 
could offer what communities of people aspired to. If citizenship can offer the special rights 
people desire, the wish for secession is less likely to grow. The relation with the populace and 
the post-colonial state should therefore be taken as a starting point when analyzing how national 
identities or nationalist sentiments have developed.  		
The Politics of Partaking 
Patrick Chabal developed a theory offering deeper understanding of how people in Africa have 
adapted themselves to post-independence politics and related to the post-colonial state. This 
theory he called 'Politics of Partaking'. On the definition of the verb 'to partake' he wrote:    
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What I mean by partake is both and simultaneously 'take part in' and 'make use of' - a 
deliberately ambiguous notion intended to convey the complex relationship between 
individuals-within-groups and the world of politics, or rather the world of politicians 
(87).    
His theory is derived from the assumption that many Africans have been unhappy with 
the political participation they have been offered after independence, but need to deal in one way 
or another with "the vagaries of contemporary politics as they wash over them" (87). Chabal 
believes that political analysts must aim to understand how Africans have dealt with not entirely 
agreeable conditions. He offered one way to do so, through the concept of partaking. Political 
partaking is as referred to in the quote above a complex relationship: he subdivided it into three 
types of relationship between the populace and the politicians: as subject, client and citizen. His 
main argument is that among Africans:  
none would reject a type of citizenship that enabled them to compel their governments to 
devote their energies to the improvement of the general well-being. However this is not 
the choice they face.  For them, therefore political partaking is often the least bad 
combination of subject, client and citizen they can contrive in the circumstances (105).   
Chabal’s reflections correspond with the point made earlier: That if citizenship offers 
what people aspire to, they are likely to accept it. Chabal believes that when this does not, people 
choose to cope with politics as they evolved after independence by choosing the least bad 
option. For some, resorting to nationalism may be just that. To evaluate whether national identity 
construction as 'a least bad option' can be explained from Chabal's theory of partaking, however, 
we must turn to the three concepts that are at the core of his theory and will thus be at the heart 
of this analysis. An attempt to grasp and explain Chabal's understanding of what subject, client 
and citizen mean and how they can fuel nationalist sentiments is offered below.  	
According to Chabal all Africans are both and simultaneously subject, client and citizen. 
Yet, these three types of political spheres can be inhabited in unequal and always changing 
measures. Chabal believes that when disregarding the relation between these political 
spheres one is likely to miss the larger picture of post-colonial politics, because it is the way they 
interact that influences how people cope with politics and have been involved in it.  The concept 
of subject refers to a relation characterized by dependence, violence, arbitrariness, inequality and 
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powerlessness. A whole set of notions that results from a form of political control that could not 
easily be disputed or challenged. In post-colonial Africa, politicians have often failed to 
represent large amounts of the ordinary people. Furthermore, the new states stayed largely 
immune to the democratic accountability mechanisms they often appeared to have. What Chabal 
observed is that the Africans realizing that they became subjects under the new regime tried to 
find other ways to express themselves politically and to secure their 
own protection. Subjecthood needed to be "by-passed, undermined or subverted". Chabal 
compared subjecthood in post-colonial Africa to subjecthood under feudalism in Europe. He 
argues that unlike in Africa, subjecthood was abolished by the subjects themselves who 
underwent a long process of trying to exert power over the rulers that finally resulted in more 
accountability. In Africa, he argues, the result of a similar process was not a greater degree of 
accountability or the abolition of subjecthood, but a dispensation: clientelism.   
The relationship between the people as client and those in power is one of anti-
symmetrical reciprocity. People seek to be clients, as the better their clientelistic relation, 
the better their status of subject. Although the relation is one of inequality, it is one in which 
subjects can assert some influence over their rulers. These in turn need to have some sort of 
legitimacy which they gain only when they respond adequately to their clients’ demands. 
Furthermore, what the politicians provide to their clients can determine one´s sense of citizenship. 
Although Chabal does not further elaborate on what clientelism means in practice, the concept 
can be further exploited. Being a client is in fact a position of accepting citizenship, either 
voluntary or involuntary. Clientelism as such, can either bring opportunities or be a limitation. 
As can be seen in the case of Mali, the fact that clients’ demands were not met by the 
government resulted in uprisings as a means to make use of the influence the clients (in this case 
the Tuareg) could assert over their rulers. This manner of exerting power over their rulers has 
resulted in agreements in which the Tuareg nationalists forced politicians to meet their demands 
in all rebellions save the first. Yet, at the same time it forced the Tuareg to remain part of a 
unified Mali, compelling them to leave their nationalist desires unfulfilled. Then, to say 
that subjecthood could not be abolished, but could be undermined by means of clientelism in 
Mali is true in so far as the means of holding power over the politicians may be violent.   
The last relation people have with the ruling regime is as citizen. As indicated earlier, it is 
when citizenship is clouded that people may resort to nationalism. While all Africans became 
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official citizens of a country after independence, having the right of nationality and being 
officially protected by a constitution, many felt not part of what was supposed to be a unifying 
nationality. When citizenship is not upheld people seek according to Chabal other ways 
of identity and protection, of which ethnicity and clientelism are most prevalent like happened in 
Mali. While the Malian elite imagined the state as a nation that would embody a variety of 
ethnicities, the Tuareg imagined an ethnic one (Lecocq, “Disputed Desert…” 26). However, as 
described above, Tuareg nationalists have been forced to accept to be clients and thus citizens. 
For some this was more acceptable than others as clientelism could offer what they aspired 
to. However, as Chabal wrote citizenship is fragile. Furthermore, Chabal argued it is more 
difficult to regain a sense of citizenship than to lose it. What this means is that even when 
citizenship is agreed upon after a rebellion, it is not secure or cannot be expected to remain 
unchanged.  
Taken all together, what we will see is that these three concepts will help us understand 
why the nation changes. The interaction of these three political spheres determines choices of 
national identity. These are not constant but ever changing. Citizenship is in fact the relation 
where subjecthood and clientelism come together, what determines whether or not opportunities 
can better be sought outside citizenship; in nationalism. Subjecthood undermines ones' sense of 
citizenship and may therefore lead to clientelism, which can be in the form of a nationalist 
revolt. Clientelism instead decreases sentiments of nationalism, or at least halt the possibilities of 
achieving them. The rulers who need to respond to demands can offer them what is necessary to 
feel a citizen. On the other hand it is also a forceful relation of accepting citizenship and offers 
therefore little guarantee of what might happen in the future. Especially when people experience 
a continuation or a revival of subjecthood in the periods following the rebellions, combined with 
the remembrance of the hurdles of previous experiences of subjecthood, nationalist sentiments 
might continue to exist or can easily reappear and prove the fragility of citizenship. Before 
exploring these concepts further in the three case studies, this thesis will 
first introduce the Tuareg people and provide some historical context on the Tuareg under 
colonialism. 
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Who are the Tuareg? 	
The Tuareg are a semi-nomadic people inhabiting large areas of the Saharan desert. Instead of 
using the word Tuareg, they originally called themselves the Kel Tamasheq, an overarching term 
for 'the people speaking Tamasheq' (Lecocq, “Disputed Desert” 2). In this thesis the term 
'Tuareg' will be used to define those who speak Tamasheq, as this is not only how they are 
known, but also how Tuareg nowadays address themselves. Besides their shared language, the 
Tuareg do not seem to have the basis of a nation in search for a state. As nomadic pastoralists 
they moved where life was possible within the central Sahara. They originally inhabited the 
mountains and valleys through parts of what is now Mali, Algeria, Niger, Libya and Burkina 
Faso (Harmon 1). Despite having a regional base, they were not restricted to boundaries 
(Whitehouse and Strazzari 216). Some of them are of Berber origin and light skinned, whereas 
others have a darker skin and more southern blood.   
The Tuareg have historically been divided, not only in perceptions of race but also in 
class and occupation, which is another reason that challenges the prospect of longing for a state 
of their own. The Tuareg are traditionally divided into clans or tewsit. These are quasi kin groups 
based on lineages and partly on castes. Within the social hierarchy three castes could be 
identified: the first consists of the noble freeman, which includes both warriors and clerks, the 
second is composed of freeman, which are the vassals and the craftsmen, and the lowest caste 
refers to the slaves, also called the Bellah-Iklan. The Bellah-Iklan are like the craftsmen 
perceived as black, while the others were generally whiter and seen as having a higher status 
(Lecocq, “Disputed Desert” 4-6).  It must be noted that they have never been the only ones living 
in the area but were accompanied by pastoralist neighbours: the Bidan, Arabs and the Fulani and 
by sedentary farmers: the Songhay, Dogon, Bambara and Hause (Lecocq, “Disputed Desert” 1).  	
Currently the Tuareg are a minority in all of the five countries they inhabited before 
colonialism. According to the World Factbook, the Tuareg comprised in 2012-2013 only 0.9 
percent of Mali's total population.These exact demographics may have been very different at 
other moments in time given the huge amounts of Tuareg who sought refuge or opportunities in 
neighbouring countries due to several regional conflicts. Yet, despite having always been a 
minority in Mali, they have made up a large amount of the people living in the northern area. The 
reason for this is that ninety percent of Mali's total population of about seventeen million lives in 
the Southern, more fertile area ("The World Factbook", "Mali"). Furthermore, the Tuareg have 
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played an important role in the Northern region due to their mobility and their participation in 
trade, transport and, most importantly, insurgencies (Harmon 2). Before going into the four 
rebellions to investigate how national identity has evolved over the years, it is necessary to 
provide some information on the period in which the seeds of Tuareg nationalism have been 
planted: the period of French colonialization in Africa.  		
The Tuareg under Colonialism  	
In the late 19th century, France had conquered much of West-Africa. What we now know as 
Mali, was then part of French-Sudan (Gremont 131). The Tuareg spearheaded resistance against 
the French, who were declared as infidels by the religious leaders of the Tuareg (Boas and 
Torheim 1280). The Tuareg were seen as the main antagonists of the French and were therefore 
brutally suppressed (Harmon 9). Military campaigns continued until 1912, when most of the 
Tuareg were defeated. In 1916, many of the Tuareg confederations rebelled once more against 
the French. They were led by the Iwellemedan, who were dominant in the region of Gao and had 
formally ruled over the Ifoghas, who have originally inhabited the Adagh n Ifoghas, a low 
mountain range in the Kidal region in mali (Lecocq, “Disputed Desert” 2). However, the 
Ifhoghas made use of the fact that the French needed some sort of political support and 
legitimacy and helped them defeat their former overlords. The rebellion brutally crushed the 
Iwellemedan by killing hundreds of them (Harmon 9). The Ifoghas have since then been the 
dominant Tuareg confederation (Pezard and Shurkin 8) and have actively participated in the four 
rebellions achieve independence, sometimes even being the sole fighting clan.  	
After 1916 the French succeeded in maintaining relative peace in the region through 
Tuareg and Arabic allies (Hall 68 – 74), including the Ifoghas (Pezard and Shurkin 8). Despite 
some groups being defeated, the Tuareg showed in general great resilience towards the colonial 
regime. The French were unable to assimilate them into colonial life (Keita 107). This becomes 
most obvious from the French acceptance of slavery in Tuareg society. While the French had 
officially abolished slavery in French-Sudan, they overlooked the Bellah-Iklan issue for they, 
according to Harmon, needed the military and political support of the Tuareg warrior clans (14). 
The aim of keeping la paix française achieved the desired results: the Tuareg reportedly showed 
great "deference and reticence" towards their colonizers (Lecocq, “Disputed Desert” 77). The 
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colonial administration was protective of the culture and traditions of the Tuareg. This is unlike 
´development policies' applied elsewhere in French Africa. In Lecocq's view, this is the result of 
French interest in the Tuareg way of life (“Disputed Desert” 77). Hall described the ambiguous 
impression the Tuareg left on the colonizers as: 	
on the one hand, wild and dangerous “tribes” of nomadic warriors who threaten the 
nascent colonial enterprise, and on the other hand, as racially white, lightly touched by 
Islam, suggesting a capacity for civilization certainly not shared by their black neighbors 
(109). 	
Indeed, the interest in the Tuareg society led to a racist classification and distinction. (Lecocq, 
“Disputed Desert” 78). These racist issues motivated the rise of ethnic tensions, which started to 
arise at the eve of independence. 	
In the years leading up to decolonization, two proposals were done by the French for 
French Irredentist Schemes to retain some influence (Hall 29). Whereas the West African 
political elites opposed these proposals, many Tuareg favored these schemes over submitting to 
black rule (Harmon 19). Yet, as the French found other ways that fulfilled their interests, Tuareg 
demands were soon forgotten (Dörrie 15). In 1960 the independent Republic of Mali was 
established and has been ruled until 1968 by Modibo Keita and his party, the Union Soudanaise-
Rassemblement Démocratique Africain. The situation was very much one of mutual stereotyping 
in which some Tuareg saw the new politicians as religiously ignorant and uncivilized and the 
Tuareg were portrayed by the government as pro-slavery racists and friends of the colonizers 
(Lecocq “Disputed Desert” 75, 76).  Furthermore, the Malian government saw the Tuareg as 
"economically and socially regressive" and therefore "an obstacle to national development (Keita 
107). The disgust over the racial prejudices has motivated the Keita regime in its dealing with the 
northern Tuareg (Harmon 23), what in turn has been at the origins of what could be called a 
Tuareg nationalism.	
 
The 1962 – 1964 Rebellion	
What has been called 'the First Tuareg Rebellion' is also known as Alfellaga, which means 'The 
Rebellion' (Lecocq, “Disputed Desert” 153). It lasted from May 1962 to August 1964 (Harmon 
24). The start was triggered by a Tuareg man who killed several Malian police agents, after 
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which the situation swiftly got out of control (Dörrie 16). The revolt was however prepared, and 
formed around a man called Zeyd ag Attaher. With his supporters, he resisted the incorporation 
of the Tuareg and in particular the Ifoghas in the Republic of Mali (Lecocq, “Disputed Desert” 
161). This is the same clan that helped the French defeat the Iwellemedan uprising in 1916. 
According to Lecocq, the ifulagen, which is the name that refers to the Ifogha fighters of the 
Alfellaga, have never exceeded 250 men (“Disputed Desert” 163). Despite their low number, the 
Malian government who had sent up to half of its forces to the North could first not bring the 
rebellion to an end. Malian forces were hindered by a rough terrain to which the ifulagen were 
much more used (Harmon 25). Unwilling to negotiate with the rebels, the Malian government 
decided in August 1963, to send its remaining regular forces to the North. The army resorted to 
"brutal reprisal tactics against the civilian population" (Lecocq 22 "Northern Mali"). According 
to Harmon, this included poisoning of wells, killing and raping women, killing cattle and 
executing random civilians (25). The government officially declared the rebellion as having 
ended at August 15, 1964 and placed the North under a repressive military (Keita 109).  
Given the numbers of fighters, the strategic aim of the Algellaga was not a military 
victory over the Malian government. The ifulagen without doubt, hoped for support of other 
Tuareg. Yet, their ultimate goal was receiving aid from Algeria and, if possible France. Zeyd ag 
Attaher believed they would as they had promised to do so in other years (Lecocq, “Disputed 
Desert” 154). The fighters received some limited, but unofficial support from Algeria, which let 
ifulagen take refuge and treat their wounded within its borders (Harmon 25). This was however 
not the assistance they wanted. Some hoped for the creation of the a French Irredentist Scheme 
and others opted for inclusion in Algeria ("La Résolution"). 	
Although independence was the aim, it was not framed into an idea of the nation-state. In 
Lecocqs opinion the nation-state, was as concept still largely alien to most of the Tuareg. In his 
view independence was rather framed in "visions on leadership, political order and the structure 
of society" as were known to the Ifoghas in pre-colonial and colonial times (“Disputed Desert 
160”). Zeyd ag Attaher was one of the Tamasheq leaders who had made clear before 
independence, he did not want to be part of the Republic of Mali. With him, many ifoghas 
continued to be discontent about submitting to 'black' rule after independence and refused the 
concept of equality (Harmon 24). Yet, this feeling was surpassed by something else: a fear of 
losing their identity. Some of the Tuareg leaders believed that the Malian state was aimed at 
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destroying Tuareg culture under the guise of modernization (Keita 108). The Kel Tamasheq were 
faced with all kind of regulations that reduced their own political power, like restrictions on the 
movement of livestock and cattle, heavy taxes and the freeing of their Bellah-Iklan, and 
mistreatment of police to enforce these regulations (Harmon 24). Moreover, the Malian political 
elite was not sympathetic to the Tuareg's nomadic lifestyle as land should be in the hands of 
those who cultivated it (Keita 107). In this light, the first uprising was  rather against inclusion in 
Mali than in favor of an independent nation-state. 
In the period around the Alfellaga it is mostly the interaction of citizen and subject that 
helps explain national identity. Logically, the uprising would not have happened if the Tuareg 
would not have become citizens. As allies of the French, the ifoghas had preferred to remain 
under some form of French rule. Their relatively good clientelistic relation had given them a 
certain amount of power, as well as a high position of subject, leading in turn to acceptance of 
French rule. In the new Republic of Mali this was very different. Citizenship was already 
perceived as precarious due to the tense relationship between the new political elite and the 
Tuareg that had grown out of the colonial era. That citizenship would fail to offer what the 
Tuareg aspired to, was reconfirmed when the Tuareg realized they remained subjects. The 
Tuareg were looked at with suspicion by their own government which consequently gave them 
little to no power. The Tuareg were not only faced by a rival Malian nationalism, but felt their 
livelihoods were being destroyed by it. The unattractive combination of being citizen while 
having no power as subject, resulted in the first form of nationalism. Trusting they would be 
offered help by either Algeria or France, the ifulagen were not aimed at negotiation with the 
Malian state but fought for independence. They did not see the need to accept citizenship and 
resort to a clientelistic relationship for better opportunities. Neither was the Malian government 
aimed at negotiation with the rebels. The army quickly suppressed nationalist desires by 
emphasizing through violence that the ifoghas were not more than subjects. Yet these methods 
would only further alienate the Tuareg and be the beginning of a pile of grievances that would 
expand the group of people longing for an independent state.    
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The 1990 – 1996 rebellion	
What is known in and outside Mali as ´The Second Tuareg Rebellion´, is often referred to as Al-
Jebha by those fighters involved, the Arabic term for front or rebellion (Lecocq, “Disputed 
Desert” 249). The aim of the revolt was the creation of an independent or autonomous territory 
for Tuareg and also Arabs within Mali (Hall 3). The period between 1990 and 1996 existed of 
two phases: A nationalist rebellion that lasted until the signing of the National Pact in 1992, and 
a period of ethnic conflict. The latter arose out of anger by other ethnic groups about the 
provisions given to the Tuareg in the national pact. Given the aims of this thesis, attention will 
only be given to the first period. The Al-Jebha started in June 1990 with raids against military 
and governmental targets by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MPLA) led by 
Iyad ag Ghali. Together with the Armed Islamic Front of Azawad (FIAA) which consisted of 
mostly Arabas and Moors, they formed the umbrella group the United Movements and Fronts of 
the Azawad (MUFA). This time the Tuareq rebels who joined came from many parts of Mali. 
They had many victories in the first months of the revolt leading in turn to repressive measures 
taken by the government army that motivated many more young Tuareg to join. They had 
fighters who had fought for Ghadaffi and had returned in Mali with experience and arms 
(Harmon 95, 96). President Traoré realized, that in contrast to the first rebellion, a military 
solution would not suffice to deal with the rebels. Therefore he sought to negotiate with the 
rebels. Under pressure of mediator Algeria, and due to the willingness of some Tuareg leaders to 
negotiate, the two main parties to the conflict, the MPA and the FIAA, abandoned their initial 
requests for independence and signed a peace treaty with Traoré in January 1991 (International 
Crisis Group 3). The Accords of Tamanrasset, denoted besides a ceasefire a political 
compromise in which the Northern regions would remain part of Mali, but would gain more 
political autonomy ("Accord Sur La..."). Soon after, Traoré was ousted from power by a military 
coup (Seely 507). The new transition committee, did not recognize the accords (Harmon 98). 	
Although the Tamanrasset Accords were not the final words on the topic, it did lead to a 
new development: A split of the MPLA. Among these groups were the People's Movement of 
Azawad (MPA), the Popular Liberation Front of Azawad (FPLA) and the Revolutionary 
Liberation Front of Azawad (ARLA) (Farhaoui 16). It was the political manifestation of different 
opinions about the main principles of the rebellion: Independence or not. Led by Iyad ag Ghali, 
who had represented the MPLA during the negotiations, the MPA changed into the MPA as a 
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moderate group who preferred autonomy within Mali.  Notably the FPLA came to exist out of 
hardliners for whom the Tamanrasset Accords were unacceptable (Lecocq, “Disputed Desert” 
263). Under pressure of the transitional government who despite not having accepted the 
Accords believed peaceful negotiations were needed, and Algerian mediators, the divided groups 
reunited under a renewed MFUA (Harmon 99). On April 11, 1992 the National Pact was signed 
by the transitional government and the MFUA. This resulted in six main promises for the North 
of Mali: a special socioeconomic status and autonomous administration for the North of Mali, 
tax exemptions, funds to reconstruct the north, withdrawal of the army from a limited amount of 
northern towns and cities, a gradual return of refugees and lastly voluntary integration of all 
former rebels into the national army. Although the in the meanwhile newly elected government 
led by Alpha Oumar Konaré did respect the National Pact rhetorically, it has never been fully 
implemented. Many Malians felt this National Pact was not deserved by the rebels. Although 
ethnic tensions were not a new phenomenon in Mali, the rise of in particular the Ganda Koy 
militia changed the nature of what was initially a nationalist rebellion to a conflict that was 
dominated by ethnicity. Peace returned in 1996 (Lecocq, “Disputed Desert” 307).	
The initial nationalist rebellion was organized in Libya and Algeria (Harmon 29). Due to 
war, droughts and poverty many Tuareg had been in exile. The two main exodus of migration 
took place in the 1950s, during the decolonization period, and in the 1960s, during and after the 
Alfellaga. Also due to droughts and further marginalization under the Traoré regime, many other 
Tuareg left Mali during the 70s and 80s (Harmon 30).  It was in exile where a Tuareg 
nationalism continued growing for two main reasons. First of all, the failure of the Alfellaga and 
the cruel treatment by the government had left a bittersweet legacy within the Tuareg society, 
which extended way beyond the Ifoghas into the Tuareg society as a whole (Keita 102, 109). 
Second, when Mali had faced severe droughts of “biblical proportions” (Harmon 27), it was 
believed that Malian officials withheld food relief to destroy or drive the Tuareg out of Mali 
(Keita 11). For the Tuareg, unequal aid distribution was ample reason to break apart from Mali 
(Lecocq, “Disputed Desert” 243). At the core of the preparations of the rebellion were “the 
children of 1963”, but they were joined by many other Tuareg living in and outside Mali 
(Harmon 30). 
Unlike in the Alfellaga it is this time the interaction of subject, citizen and client that can 
help understand the construction of national identities prior to the Al-Jebha, and the 
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deconstruction during the Al-Jebha.  Even more after the Alfellaga than before, the Tuareg were 
placed in the position of subject. Whereas most Tuareg had been outside the web of politics 
before the first rebellion, the violent response towards the Tuareg as a whole highlighted their 
relation as subject with the politicians. Their position was covered by all of the terms that 
characterize subjecthood: dependence, violence, arbitrariness, inequality and powerlessness. The 
period of marginalization that followed during the period of droughts, sharpened the already 
present grievances. It is not surprising therefore, that the Al-Jebha was fought by many more 
fighters than the Alfellaga. Whereas Chabal wrote that people seek to be clients to upgrade their 
position as subject, many Tuareg had no chance and sought refuge in other places. This place in 
society undermined any sense of citizenship. After a long period of marginalization and exile, a 
nationalist rebellion was the best option within the circumstances for many Tuareg. What 
happened then is that after years, Tuareg became clients. The rebellion had forced the Malian 
government into negotiations. Some, more happily than others, accepted the Tamanrasset 
Accords. The agreements fulfilled their demands and made them more or less voluntarily accept 
citizenship in Mali and abandon their nationalist identity. Others were more reluctant to accept 
these accords that would let their nationalist desires unfulfilled.  Yet under pressure, the National 
Pact was signed by all parties involved, who realized independence was no option. Clientelism 
had dissolved the nation, but the hardships that the Tuareg had undergone since independence 
would not be easily forgotten. Silently waiting until citizenship would prove fragile again. 
 
The 2006 – 2009 rebellion	
After almost ten years of relative peace, a new rebellion broke out which lasted from May 2006 
until early 2009. Rather than a new or third rebellion, it is better described as a renewed rebellion. 
A failure to implement the commitments made in the National Pact and discontent among the in 
the army  integrated Tuareg, led to a revival of the previous rebellion, the Al-Jebha (International 
Crisis Group 3) (Utas 122). The rebellion was not aimed at national independence, but rather at 
change within the country. On the 23rd of May, a group of Tuareg army deserters, attacked 
military barracks in the Northern region of Kidal "seizing weapons and demanding greater 
autonomy and development assistance" (Freedom House). The group behind the attacks was the 
new Democratic Alliance of May 23 for Change (ADC), which was centered around Hassan Af 
	 	 		
	 	 18		
Fagaga and Ibrahim Bahanga. Most of the ADC members were former MPA members, The 
MPA had been the movement in the previous rebellion who had advocated for negotiations 
rather than independence, like the ADC now.  Although this rebellion could be called a renewal 
of the Al-Jehba, it was unlike the Al-Jebha, entirely based on the Ifoghas. They had come to 
define the MPA after it had split in the previous rebellion. (Lecocq, “Disputed Desert” 335). The 
movement did not last long as a hasty peace was brokered once again by Algeria. Iyad ag Ghali 
who had previously been leading the MPA, and soon after the uprising had become involved, 
signed new peace accords with the government of Mali in June 2006 (International Crisis Group 
3). The Algiers Accords made provisions very similar to the ones from the Tamanrasset Accords 
and the National Pact, but in contrast this agreement was only concentrated on Kidal where the 
ADC was based.  	
Consequently, the Algiers Accords were considered to be too much in favor of Iyad ag 
Ghali's personal interests and therefore refused by some political parties and non-Ifoghas 
(Chauzal and Van Damme). Also Ibrahim Bahanga, in contrast to Iyad ag Ghali and Hassan af 
Fagaga, would soon reject the Algiers Accords. Although willing to negotiate, he was 
disgruntled over the compromises other rebels were willing to make. In his opinion they gave in 
too quickly: before the governments had made any of its commitments true (Morgan “The 
Causes…”). He continued the rebellion because of a delay in the implementation of the 
Tamanrasset Accords (ICG 4). This time he was followed by a much smaller group of fighters  
(Pezard and Shurkin18) (Lecocq, “Disputed Desert..” 335, 336).  In May 2007 they began a 
guerilla warfare against the government, including attacks to isolated positions, the kidnapping 
of soldiers and mining roads (Emerson 674). In September 2007 it officially formed a new 
splinter group called the Northern Malian Tuareg Alliance for Change (ATNMC) (Harmon 106), 
When on May 2008 Bahanga’s rebel group attacked and killed 63 soldiers, the government 
switched to a military solution and set up local Tuareg and Arab militias to fight the ATNMC 
(Pezard and Shurkin 18). One of the militias, was led by an allied Tuareg Imghad. The Imghads 
had historically been dependent on the Ifoghas and Gamou had nurtured hate against them (ICG 
4, Pezard and Shurkin 18, Chauzal and Van Damme). These militias decisively defeated 
Bahanga's men in 2009 who consequently fled to Libya (Harmon 107).   
The 2006 – 2009 rebellion was actually no nationalist rebellion at all: No one asked for 
independence. The demands of the 2006 rebellion were in fact very similar to what has been 
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promised by the government in the National Pact. The rebels did not seek for independence but 
accepted their citizenship in Mali. They had felt their demands had not been met and knew that 
asserting influence over those in power was possible. In other words, they made use of the power 
they inhabited as clients: the relationship which best explains this rebellion. Some Ifogha’s 
resorted to violence and demanded better provisions in the region of Kidal where they were 
based. Instead of uniting a Tuareg nation, these demands divided them. Bahanga showed a lack 
of trust that the government would actually do what it had promised. It had failed to do so after 
the National Pact and it might fail again. Similarly, the given provisions to Iyad ag Ghali, led to 
discontent among other Tuareg. Lastly, President Amadou Toumané Touré made use of a rule-
and-divide policy, which showed how influential people's position of client is for their political 
actions and their (dis)unity. He needed to have legitimacy from only some Tuareg (in this case 
the Imghads), to neutralize Bahanga and his men. These were happy to have this power and felt 
no desire to strive with the Ifoghas for a similar goal. Touré therefore did not need to respond to 
the demands of the ATNMC. Finally, the ATNMC was defeated and therefore once again placed 
in a position of powerlessness towards the state, that of subject. The wiping out of their 
clientelist power, would therefore make nationalism again more appealing and eventually be one 
of the causes of the latest rebellion.  
	
The 2012 – present Rebellion  
In 2012, Malian government forces were once again faced by a Tuareg rebellion. At January 
17th government forces were attacked in the town of Menaka by fighters from the newly formed 
National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA).  This rebellion was different than 
the previous: instead of demanding more autonomy, the MNLA fought a war against the 
government to call Azawad soon their independent homeland. Soon the attacks spread from 
Menaka to other cities in Northern Mali, e.g. Tessalit, Aguelhok, Timbuktu Kidal and Gao 
(Harmon 178, Chauzal and Van Damme). The MNLA declared the region of Azawad 
independent at April 6th, 2012. In an interview for Le Point Afrique, Hama Ag Sid'Ahmed, 
spokesperson of the MNLA, explained that the people of the North have never been treated as 
citizens and have accordingly never felt Malian. According to him, that is why they ask for the 
independence of Azawad. Indeed, the considerations mentioned in the Déclaration de 
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l'Indépendence d'Azawad, describe a tense relationship from independence onwards between 
‘the people of Azawad’ and the government.  The declaration is based on the consideration that 
Azawad had become part of Mali without its consent in 1960. Furthermore it recalls "the 
massacres, the acts of violence, the humiliations, the spoliations and genocides” carried out 
during the rebellions. Likewise the MNLA recalls the behavior of the regime during the 
droughts, stating that “Mali… used the several droughts… to make our people disappear by 
annihilating them, even though Mali has requested and obtained generous humanitarian aid”. In 
general it considers 50 years marked by “corruption and collusion” that endangered “the 
existence of the People of Azawad”. It demanded “the international community as a whole” to 
recognize Azawad. However, no country did (Fessy).  
The MNLA was established in October 2011 as an alliance of groups. One of them, the 
National Movement of Azawad (MNA), was formed in Mali in 2010. The MNA campaigned for 
self-determination, because the relations with the state, they believed, had come to a "breaking 
point" (International Crisis Group 7). A variety of factors had eroded trust in the government. 
Including continued marginalization of the north and brutal treatment of the army against the 
Northern population, and the failure to hold on to the promises made in previous agreements 
(Idit.). Other members of the MNLA came from Libya. While in exile, Bahanga had planned to 
renew the 2006-2009 rebellion. Ghadaffi had recruited many Tuareg into his army, who had 
either fled Mali during one of the rebellions or had sought for better opportunities. The demise 
of Ghadaffi's dictatorship in 2011 was the opportunity for Bahanga and some of his allies to put 
their plan into action. Arms and ammunition from the Libyan war were brought to Mali, 
followed by many Tuareg whose relationship of mutual opportunism with Ghadaffi had ended 
(Morgan "The Causes..."). Those Tuareg returning to Mali, and those awaiting them, united into 
the MNLA. Compared to the other rebellions this one was the best armed and most united 
(Harmon 176). The leaders of the MNLA were aware that disunity had weakened the previous 
rebellions, and consequently made great efforts to reach out to the entire Northern population of 
Azawad (Morgan, “The Causes…”). Although the MNLA presents itself as a movement 
speaking for the People of Azawad, most of the members are Tuareg, predominantly Ifoghas 
and Idnan, who had been willing to advance their internal relationships which had historically 
divided them (Pézard and Shurkin 53).  
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Despite the relative unity of the MNLA, the Tuareg as a whole are divided. Some Tuareg 
groups, have strongly opposed the separatist ideology (Whitehouse and Strazzari 221). The 
Imghad for instance, have remained loyal to the state like they did in the 2006-2009 rebellion 
(Morgan, “The Causes…”). Furthermore, Iyad ag Ghali had returned. This time as the leader of 
Ansar Dine, a Tuareg and Islamist organization aimed at imposing Sharia Law in Mali (Harmon 
180). His newly developed fundamentalist ideas, were opposed by many Taureg who practice a 
more tolerant Islam (ICG 12). Iyad ag Ghali in turn, rejected the separatist cause. In an interview 
for Le Jeune Afrique, he said “Ansar Dine knows nothing but Mali and Sharia”. Ansar Dine had 
linkages with two other Jihadist movements in Mali: Al-Qaida in the Maghreb (AQIM) and the 
Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West-Africa (MUJAO). Soon after the declaration of the 
independence of Azawad, these replaced the MNLA’s stronghold in Azawad by ousting them out 
of the major cities in June and July of 2012 (ICG 16, 17, Harmon 173). When elements of Ansar 
Dine, MUJAO and AQIM attempted to expand their influence towards the south of Mali 
international intervention was triggered. In January 2013 a French led military operation was 
employed next to an African-Led International Support Mission in Mali upon the request of the 
interim Malian government and under the approval of the UN Security Council ("MINUSMA 
Background "). The intervention quickly ousted jihadists out of the North (for a while), but also 
resulted in an armed stand-off between separatists and the government. In June 2013, the 
government did sign a preliminary peace agreement with the Tuareg nationalists, but it took long 
for real negotiations to start. The newly elected government did not want to make concessions to 
the nationalists at first. Resumed acts of violence in November 2013 and May 2014, finally 
convinced the government to negotiate (Reeve 1, ICG, "Policy Briefing" 2). In the meantime the 
MNLA, had merged with two other movements advocating for self-determination: an Arab one 
(Mouvement Arabe de l'Azawad) and a newly formed Tuareg movement aimed at uniting the 
MNLA and Ansar Dine (Haut Conseil pour l'Unité de l'Azawad) (Naudé, Nyirabikali). Together 
they formed the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA). The Coordination first rejected the 
peace agreement, which did not recognize the independence of Azawad (Boutellis, "Can the 
UN.." 9). The Algiers agreement allowed for regional assemblies, but eliminated chances of 
autonomy or even federalism in Azawad. Only under high pressure of the international 
community, the CMA eventually signed the agreement in June 2015. Mainly Algeria, France and 
the United Nations´ peacekeeping mission MINUSMA played a predominant role (Boutellis, 
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"Mali: Signing..."). Redwan Ag Mohamed Ali, one of the representatives of the CMA said to Al 
Jazeera: "I think this is the most we can get in the current context and with the world 
communities' readiness to accept our demands" ("Malian Rivals..."). Within the MNLA different 
opinions exist over the accords, further fragmented during the negotiations. As the agreement 
falls far short however of the goals the MNLA initially had, many separatists have been unhappy 
with this result (Höije, Boutellis 9, 10, Ag Sid’Ahmed). Furthermore, spokesman of the MNLA, 
Hama Ag Sid'Ahmed said to Le Point Afrique that the population did not believe in the 
negotiations. Even when leaving aside the government’s willingness to implement the peace 
agreement, this distrust is not unjustified. Violence has resumed in Mali and the security 
situation has deteriorated making it difficult for the government to do so.  
Like the previous rebellions, the fourth rebellion has shown that if citizenship had offered 
what the Tuareg aspired to, a nationalist revolt would have been unlikely to occur. In contrast to 
the Second and Third rebellion however, nationalist fighters were unwilling to negotiate due to a 
change in the perceived interaction of subject, client and citizen. Like the ifulagen fighters of the 
first rebellion, the members of the MNLA did not want to be citizens of Mali anymore. Most not 
even when the government would promise to provide what would be needed to uphold a sense of 
citizenship. A history of subjecthood combined with the realities of clientelism offered no 
satisfying prospect for the future except for independence. The realities of the relationship of 
subject, of course without using the concept of 'subject' explicitly, were mentioned in the 
declaration of the independent state of Azawad. The MNLA pointed out the relationship of 
violence, powerlessness and arbitrariness between the Azawadi people and the state during the 
rebellions by touching upon the genocides and massacres as well as the relation of inequality and 
dependence by highlighting the continued marginalization and the corruption and ignorance 
during the droughts. The fact that the MNLA proclaimed the independent state of Azawad 
"irrevocably", however, resulted from the experienced limits of clientelism. Nationalists in both 
the Second and Third rebellion saw the opportunities of their position as clients, that of 
negotiating with those in power. Although the initial aim of the second rebellion had been to 
liberate Azawad, many left their nationalist desires behind when the government showed 
determined to deal with the reasons that had caused the nationalists’ discontent. Inclusion within 
Mali could be accepted as long as the government would respond to the clients’ demands. This 
was further illustrated by the third rebellion, which had been a consequence of the state’s failure 
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to live up to its promises and was not aimed at independence. Although still willing to negotiate, 
Bahanga was suspicious of the 2006 Algiers Accords. Continued marginalization of the North 
proved him right. Combined with his defeat the third rebellion had confirmed that the rebels’ 
clientelist power was limited and short lived. It could not force the government to respond to 
their demands. Negotiation therefore, was much more difficult with the MNLA fighters and the 
whish for independence bigger. While trying to reject to let go of their separatist aspirations, 
their asymmetrical relationship with the state, admittedly derived from the international 
communities support for state actors rather than non-state ones, obliged them to once again sign 
a peace accord and officially be citizens of Mali.  	
Conclusion 
What has shown throughout the thesis is that Tuareg nationalism should not be ascribed to them 
being a homogenous community. Instead it has been the relation with the state that has defined 
the evolution of the nation. This argument alone however, is not enough, but requires 
theorization to provide insight in the future of Tuareg nationalism. As little research has been 
done on national identity construction, this thesis did so. By analyzing the four Tuareg led 
rebellions, it tried to assess how the three concepts central to Chabal´s Politics of Partaking can 
help understand national identity construction.The rebellions have shown that nationalism is a 
consequence of the interaction of subject, client and citizen. They have all shown that if the 
government had provided the necessities of citizenship (in the eyes of the rebels), instead of 
undermining it through subjecthood, none of these rebellions would have occurred. The 
experience of subjecthood included the powerlessness towards the new elites at independence, 
the violence during the rebellions and continuous marginalization and repression. These were the 
initial causes of the revolts, because they made the idea of self-determination more attractive 
than citizenship. Whereas the rebels of the first rebellion did not seek for clientelism, they did in 
the latest three rebellions. As the Malian leaders are dependent on their clients, although less 
than the clients on their patrons, they were forced into negotiation. Similarly, for the rebels, the 
potential of negotiation became a better option than continuing to push their nationalist desires 
through. Agreements were made that confirmed their inclusion in Mali. Consequently clientelism, 
in contrast to subjecthood, deconstructed national identities. For some, especially for rebels of 
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the second and third rebellion, peace negotiations became more attractive than secessionism 
because they were hoped to resolve the problems that had causes the uprisings. For others, it was 
the best choice because they realized having no other choice due to their limited power as clients.  
What is seen, is that the interaction of the three different relationships changed 
throughout time and influenced the choices rebels made about their national identity. Most 
important, the second and third rebellions have shown, that while rebels officially agreed upon 
citizenship, the government did not live up to its promises of providing the rights citizenship 
would entail. Already in the second and third rebellion, but especially in the fourth rebellion, 
nationalists were discouraged to sign the peace accord due to suspicion of the supposed results. 
The continuation of subjecthood after the peace agreements had revealed the limits of clientelist 
power (to force the government to respond to their demands) and shown the fragility of 
citizenship. Because  their perceived position as subject, client and citizen had changed, national 
identities were more resistant to change. However, the nationalists have once again been forced 
to leave their nationalist desires behind due to the asymmetrical power they inhabit as clients. 
The 2012 rebellion has so far led to two main responses of the international community towards 
the nationalist rebels. First, the declaration of Azawad has been rejected and second, it has 
pushed the nationalists to sign a peace agreement with Mali. This time more than ever before, the 
signing of the peace agreement has been involuntarily and only because of the realization 
independence could not be achieved. 	
In this thesis it is seen that peace agreements, which forced nationalists to accept 
citizenship by means of clientelism, offered little guarantee of what happened afterwards. The 
´imposed´ peace of 2015 is therefore unlikely to be an adequate response to the circumstances: It 
cannot assure a fifth rebellion will not occur. Even worse, a failed implementation of the peace 
agreement might only make the situation worse and confirm that the best combination of subject, 
citizen and client must be sought in independence. However, this thesis has also shown, that 
unlike the Tuareg nation has been presented, it has not been a community which continuously 
and unanimously expressed nationalism. Instead, it was dependent on whether or not they were 
treated by the government as citizens. That the independence of Azawad has been rejected 
against the will of the nationalists, does therefore not need to be a reason for a fifth rebellion to 
occur. The problem is that the nationalists do not believe anymore in the opportunities 
clientelism may offer what they seek: a sense of citizenship. What this means, is that if a 
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peaceful relation can be achieved between the Tuareg and the state and a sense of citizenship can 
slowly be regained, nationalist identities can be left behind fore good. However, as long as it is 
not understood how the nation has been constructed and deconstructed and independence is seen 
as the Tuareg´s only wish, the response to the rebellion will not go beyond the hasty brokered 
peace in which both the Malian government and nationalists unwillingly made concessions. Only 
when all parties are content about their mutual relationship real peace can be achieved. Given the 
history of the relation between the Tuareg and the state, this will not be easy. Therefore, more 
attention must be given to the peace process by the international community and further research 
must be done on reconciliation processes.  	 	
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Map of Azawad as of 6. Apr. 2012 
 
Area declared independent by the MNLA (Azawad Breakaway State in Mali).	
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